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Abstract 
Rating agencies state that they take a rating action only when it is unlikely to be 
reversed shortly afterwards. Based on a formal representation of the rating process, I 
show that such a policy provides a good explanation for the empirical evidence: Rating 
changes occur relatively seldom, exhibit serial dependence, and lag changes in the 
issuers’ default risk. In terms of informational losses, avoiding rating reversals can be 
more harmful than monitoring credit quality only twice per year.  
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1   Introduction 
Moody’s Investors Service, one of the leading credit rating agencies, takes a rating 
action only “when it is unlikely to be reversed within a relatively short period of time” 
(Cantor, 2001, p. 175). As an explanation for this rating policy, Cantor cites the 
market’s “expectation for stable ratings”. Intriguingly, rating agencies are often accused 
of being too slow to adjust their ratings.
1 Could it be that the criticism rating agencies 
receive is the outcome of their desire to meet the market’s preferences? This is the 
question I am going to address.  
My analysis is built on a formal representation of the rating process. I model 
ratings as a mapping of a continuous variable, called credit quality, into discrete 
categories. Unmanaged, the discreteness produces dependencies in rating changes. The 
mechanics behind this feature, which is reminiscent of discreteness effects in stock price 
returns (see Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997), is as follows: If credit quality follows 
a probability distribution whose density declines monotonically towards the tails, a 
threshold triggering a rating change is more likely to be crossed by a small amount than 
by a large one. The closer the credit quality is to the rating boundary just crossed, 
however, the larger is the probability of a subsequent rating reversal relative to the 
probability of observing another rating change in the same direction. This bias towards 
rating reversals can be avoided by managing ratings as described in the above quote.  
In this paper, rating management is implemented by setting tolerance regions 
around rating boundaries. If credit quality surpasses a boundary, but lies within the 
tolerance regions, the rating change is suppressed. Through simulations, I show that a 
policy of rating bounce avoidance could explain many of the empirical rating 
characteristics that have been interpreted as evidence of informational inefficiencies. 
With rating management, ratings are relatively stable, while rating changes are serially 
correlated and preceded by substantial changes in default probabilities.  
Apart from rating bounce avoidance, the agencies’ rating systems are 
characterized by another peculiarity. Most rating agencies employ a through-the-cycle 
approach, that is, neglect cyclical variations in credit quality when assigning ratings. 
                                                 
1 Cf., for example, the Economist (1997, p. 70) on the Asian crisis: “The raters, firms such as Moody’s 
Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s, Duff & Phelps and IBCA, are supposed to be the financial markets’ 
early warning system. Instead,  the agencies have spent the past few months belatedly reacting to events.”  
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Though related, the two features are distinct. They both lead to a decrease in rating 
volatility, but the problem of rating reversals arises even if credit quality is not cyclical.
2 
Löffler (2001) shows that the through-the-cycle method, while able to explain important 
stylized facts like rating stability, fails to account for the predictability of rating 
changes.  
Another possible explanation for the stylized facts is a slow processing of new 
information. Such an underreaction could be of a psychological nature, reflecting a 
common human trait (Edwards, 1968). It could also be due to infrequent revisions of 
ratings. The fact that rating agencies do not monitor ratings continuously is evident from 
their placing issuers on watchlists. Agencies would not have to devote special attention 
to individual issuers if all issuers were under continuous review anyway.  
One could suspect that putting an issuer on credit watch indicates a situation in 
which the credit quality is no longer in line with the current rating but where the rating 
change is suppressed in order to avoid its likely reversal. If used in this way, credit 
watch could mitigate informational losses from rating bounce avoidance because it 
would signal the true credit quality to outside observers. However, this is not what 
agencies claim to do:  
“These Watchlists list the names of credits whose Moody's ratings have a 
likelihood of changing. These names are actively under review because of 
developing trends or events which, in Moody's opinion, warrant a more extensive 
examination.”
3  
CreditWatch highlights the potential direction of a short- or long-term rating. It 
focuses on identifiable events and short-term trends that cause ratings to be placed 
under special surveillance by Standard & Poor’s analytical staff. These may 
include mergers, recapitalizations, voter referendums, regulatory action, or 
anticipated operating developments.
4 
Putting a borrower on watch indicates a situation in which the probability of a change in 
                                                 
2 Consistent with this view, Cantor (2001) states that the avoidance of rating reversals supports the 
through-the-cycle approach in reducing rating volatility. 
3 http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/watchlist/watchlist.asp, 23/01/2001. 
4 http://www.standardandpoors.com/ResourceCenter/RatingsDefinitions.html#creditwatch, 23/01/2001.  
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credit quality is - due to imminent events - relatively high, not one where credit quality 
has already changed.  
This paper cannot answer the question whether it is the raters’ policy or a 
combination of informational inefficiencies that underlie the stylized facts. What it does 
show, for example, is that the effects of rating bounce avoidance can lead to substantial 
informational losses, similar to those brought about by i nfrequent monitoring. Any 
critique of the rating agencies runs the risk of being partial as long as it does not take the 
official rating policy into account. In consequence, market participants should ask rating 
agencies to reveal their rating policy in sufficient detail. Otherwise the market will not 
know what it gets, nor will it be able to evaluate the quality of rating agencies.  
The related literature includes papers on empirical characteristics of agency 
ratings. Carey and Hrycay (2001) and Kealhofer, Kwok and Weng (1998) find that 
agency ratings are relatively stable compared to alternative rating systems. Altman and 
Kao (1998) and Lando and Skødeberg (2002) document the existence of serial 
dependence in rating changes. Delianedis and Geske (1999) show that rating changes 
lag changes in default probabilities. Their evidence is in line with previous findings that 
stock prices and stock analyst forecasts predict rating changes (e.g. Holthausen and 
Leftwich, 1986, and Ederington and Goh, 1998). Extant normative or descriptive papers 
on rating systems do not address the problem of rating bounces. Krahnen and Weber 
(2001) propose general standards for good rating practice. A report by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) provides a comprehensive overview of 
rating practices. Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001) describe the rating system of Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s and propose a proytotype rating system for bank internal ratings. 
Kuhner (2001), finally, presents a signaling game in which rating agencies can have 
incentives to misrepresent credit quality in times of enhanced systemic risk. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a 
formalization of rating processes. Section 3 uses simulations to quantify the effects of 
rating policies on rating dynamics. Section 4 concludes.   
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2   Formalizing rating policies  
Credit ratings can be viewed as a mapping of credit quality into discrete categories 
i=1,..., N. A borrower is assigned rating grade i if the credit quality z lies within the 
boundaries for that grade, 
i
lower b  and 
i
upper b . Many, but not all rating systems take this 
credit quality to be the probability of default.
5 I consider a rating system with 17 rating 
categories (N=17) excluding default, which is the number of (modified) rating grades 
for which Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s publish default rate statistics.  
The credit quality  z is assumed to follow a random walk with normally 
distributed innovations:  
) , 0 ( ~ ,
2
1 s e e N iid z z t t t t + = -              (1) 
In the simulations, periodicity is one month; the annual variance of credit quality 
changes is set to unity, which implies  s
2=12
-0.5. For the purpose of the paper, the 
random walk specification is useful because it leaves no role for a through-the-cycle 
approach. It introduces an inconsistency because credit quality diverges to extreme 
levels as time passes, but the robustness checks show that choosing a mean-reverting 
process does not change conclusions. One could also object that the empirical dynamics 
of agency ratings are difficult to replicate with structural models that rely on a normally 
distributed state variable (Gordy and Heitfield, 2001). As demonstrated in section 3.4, 
however, such apparent departures from normality can be due to rating management. 
For borrowers situated right in the middle between the boundaries of their rating 
category, the probability that the rating remains stable on a one-year horizon is set to 
35%.
6 To obtain a rating stability of 35% for these median borrowers, the width of a 
rating class has to be set equal to 2F
-1(1-(1-0.35) / 2), with F  (￿) denoting the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. Arbitrarily setting the lower boundary of the 
worst grade to zero, rating boundaries are as follows:  
  17 ,..., 1 ), 2 / ) 35 . 0 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
1 = - - F - =
- i i b
i
lower  
  16 ,..., 1 ), 2 / ) 35 . 0 1 ( 1 ( 2
1 = - - F =
- i i b
i
upper           (2) 
                                                 
5 Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) for a description of rating systems. 
6 The robustness checks will consider different values of rating stability, and allow stability to differ 
across rating categories.  
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A rating stability of 35% is below the figures reported in Standard & Poor’s (2001), 
where the median stability across grades AAA to CCC is equal to 74.1%. However, the 
empirical stability of agency ratings is likely to be affected by the rating policy. 
Kealhofer, Kwok, and Weng (1998) report a transition matrix for ratings which are 
based on statistical estimates of default probabilities, that is, a transition matrix not 
affected by active rating management. There, the median stability is 44.4%. Since I use 
17 rating grades instead of seven as in Kealhofer, Kwok and Weng, I regard a value 
lower than 44.4% to be appropriate.  
To associate a given credit quality with a default probability, I set the one-year 
default probabilities of median borrowers equal to the historical default rates of the 
corresponding S&P rating categories. In particular for ratings better than BBB, 
historical default rates are imprecise estimates of the underlying default probabilities; 
sometimes they are zero. I therefore depart from the historical default rates and let the 
model default probabilities decline linearly from 0.1% for category 6 (~ A) to 0.04% for 
category 1 (~AAA). The model default probabilities as well as the empirical default 
rates for S&P and Moody’s rating grades are listed in Table 1. 
Having specified the default probabilities for median borrowers, the default 
probability for any given z is obtained through linear interpolation.
7 In the simulations, 
default is modeled as an exogenous event whose probability depends on credit quality. 
In month t, the probability of default is one twelfth of the default probability associated 
with the previous credit quality zt-1. Due to the non-linear relationship between credit 
quality and default probabilities, the resulting one-year default frequencies need not be 
equal to the specified one-year default probabilities. Differences are negligible, 
however: I simulate 100,000 one-year paths to determine default frequencies. They 
amount to 0.224% (0.988%) for borrowers with an initial model default probability of 
0.22% (0.94%). Despite the large sample size, these differences are not statistically 
significant. Note, too, that the conclusions of this paper do not rest on an analysis of 
realized default rates. 
 Even though the state variable z follows a random walk, the rating derived from 
this variable will not be. Consider a borrower whose credit quality crosses a rating 
boundary. Since credit quality changes follow a bell-shaped distribution, the boundary 
                                                 
7 The minimum default probability is set to 0.04%; for credit qualities at or below zero, the monthly 
default probability is set to 100%.   
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is more likely to be exceeded by a small than by a large amount. Conditional on a rating 
change, the probability that the rating change is reversed is thus larger than the 
probability that the rating change is followed by another change in the same direction. 
In the limit, when the credit quality just hits the boundary, the probability of a reversal 
is 50%, while the probability of observing another change in the same direction is, on a 
one-year horizon, equal to F (2 F
-1
 (1-(1-0.35) / 2) )  = 18.21%.  
As noted in the introduction, Moody’s claims to take a rating action only when it 
is unlikely to be reversed within a relatively short period of time. The description does 
neither specify the time horizon nor what is exactly meant by unlikely. Assume that, at 
each rating review date, the rating agency wants to keep the probability of a reversal 
within the next m years below  p*. Within the rating model described above, such a 
policy can be formulated as follows. The probability p that a rating change is reversed in 
the next m years depends on the difference between the credit quality and the rating 
boundary just crossed:
  
  ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
- F = >
- F = £
= =
+
+
downgrades after      Prob
      upgrades after      Prob
sal) Prob(rever
m b z b z
m z b b z
p
t in crossed
t
t in crossed
m t
t
t in crossed t in crossed
m t    (3) 
The rating policy prescribes that the probability of reversal p is smaller than a target 
value p*.
8 It can be implemented by requiring credit quality to exceed a rating boundary 
by at least  ( ) m p*
1 - F  in order for a rating change to occur. What happens if credit 
quality crosses two boundaries, but fails to exceed the second boundary by the critical 
amount? In this case, the rating will be adjusted by one grade rather than two. Figure 1 
shows the various possibilities for a single-period change in credit quality. 
The following example illustrates the conservatism that can be introduced by 
such a rating policy. Assume p*=0.2 and m=1, that is, the rating agency wants to avoid 
situations where rating changes are reversed with a probability of 20% within one year. 
A rating boundary then has to be exceeded by  ( ) 2 . 0
1 - F =0.842. This tolerance region is 
almost as wide as the interval pertaining to one rating grade, which has a width of 0.908 
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking, the probability of reversal examined here is the probability that credit quality moves  
to a level consistent with the previous rating. Since rating management influences not only current but 
also subsequent rating decisions, this is different from the probability of actual rating reversals prevailing 
under a volatility-reducing rating policy.  
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for a rating stability of 35%. In effect, such a rating policy would blur differences 
between neighboring rating grades.  
3   Rating bounce avoidance as an explanation of stylized facts  
In this section I use the rating model described above to assess whether the desire to 
avoid frequent rating reversals could underlie the peculiarities of agency ratings that 
have been documented in the literature. Notably, 
-  agency ratings appear relatively stable compared to other rating systems; 
-  ratings exhibit drift. Subsequent rating changes in the same direction are more 
frequent than subsequent rating changes in opposite directions;  
-  ratings lag changes in issuers’ default probabilities. 
These stylized facts will be addressed one after another within the framework laid out in 
the previous section. I assume that rating agencies pursue a policy of avoiding rating 
reversals. The tolerated probability for rating reversals p* is set at 0.1, 0.2 or 0.3; the 
time period m is chosen to be 0.25, 0.5 and 1, corresponding to time intervals of three, 
six and twelve months respectively.  
The effects of rating bounce avoidance are assessed through Monte Carlo 
simulations. Periodicity is one month. In one run of the simulations, I generate a random 
path for the credit quality z. According to the mapping rules from section 2, the credit 
quality  z is translated into ratings. Since the assumed credit quality dynamics are 
independent of the current and past credit qualities, and the width of rating categories is 
uniform across grades, the starting value for the credit quality is not decisive for the 
results. I choose the initial credit quality to be the one of a median borrower within 
rating category BB. On a one-year horizon, the associated default probability is 0.94%. 
One run of the Monte Carlo simulations extends over a period of ten years. I perform 
10,000 replications for each parameterization. 
 
3.1  Ratings are relatively stable 
Kealhofer, Kwok and Weng (1998) and Carey and Hrycay (2001) find that agency 
ratings are significantly less volatile than alternative ratings. Kealhofer, Kwok and 
Weng estimate default probabilities based on the default model of Merton (1974) and 
categorize borrowers according to these probabilities. Carey and Hrycay use a logit  
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model to assign borrowers to rating grades. Typically, 40% to 50% of these ratings 
remain stable over a one-year horizon, compared to 80% to 90% in the case of agency 
ratings. The ratings constructed in Kealhofer, Kwok and Weng and in Carey and Hrycay 
are based on seven and five categories, respectively. Since I use 17 grades in this paper, 
rating stability will generally be lower. However, the simulation results and the 
empirical evidence can still be compared with respect to relative differences in rating 
stability. 
Table 2 summarizes simulated one-year transition probabilities for various 
assumptions about the acceptable reversal probability p* and the time horizon m used to 
compute this probability. If there is no rating bounce avoidance, that is, p* is equal to 
the maximum value of 0.5, rating stability is equal to the 35% that were used to 
calibrate the model. For p*<0.5, rating stability increases. It ranges from 38% to 87%. 
With a tolerated reversal probability of 0.2 and a time horizon of six months, the rating 
stability is 55%. Rating bounce avoidance can thus lead to a considerable increase in the 
stability of credit ratings. The simulated figures largely mirror the empirical differences 
between agency ratings and rating systems that are known not to be influenced by 
ratings management. Since the precise rating policy of the agencies is unknown, it is 
difficult to judge whether rating bounce avoidance completely explains the empirical 
evidence. For the intermediate parameter combination p*=0.2 and m=0.5, for example, 
one could argue that it does not. Both in Kealhofer, Kwok and Weng (1998) and in 
Carey and Hrycay (2001), the stability of agency ratings is up to twice the one of 
alternative rating systems; in Standard & Poor’s (2001), the maximum empirical 
stability for modified grades is 90%, the median across the 17 grades is 78%. This 
would not leave us with a puzzle, though. The agencies’ policy of rating through the 
cycle, which i s not modeled here, can also lead to a significant increase in rating 
stability (Löffler, 2001). Together, the two peculiarities of the agencies’ rating approach 
could well explain the empirical facts, even if rating bounce avoidance alone did not. 
3.2  Rating changes are serially dependent 
Empirical studies of rating changes have documented significant positive serial 
dependence (Altman and Kao, 1992, and Lando and Skødeberg, 2001). Such a 
dependence can arise even if ratings are continuous and rating analysts efficiently use 
available information. An analyst who learns that the default probability of a firm will 
decrease over time will not completely incorporate this information into the current  
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rating if the rating horizon is shorter than the time span in which the firm’s restructuring 
is completed. Partial responses to new information, however, will create positive serial 
dependence. Since I model credit quality as a random walk, this explanation can be 
ruled out for the simulation experiments conducted here. 
Altman and Kao (1992) examine the rating dynamics of 1970-1985 new bond 
issues. They measure serial dependence through a statistic defined as the frequency of 
subsequent rating changes in one direction divided by the frequency of subsequent 
rating changes in opposite directions. If ratings exhibit positive drift, the statistic is 
larger than one. If an upgrade is more likely to be followed by a downgrade, and vice 
versa, the statistic is smaller than one. I compute the statistic within the simulated 
samples. In each run, which spreads over ten years, I take only the first two rating 
changes to compute the statistic; this is appropriate because Altman and Kao (1992) 
examine rating changes of newly rated bond issues. If a simulation run contains less 
than two rating changes, it does not enter the calculation of the test statistic. 
The results are reported in Table 3. If raters do not try to avoid rating reversals 
(p*=0.5), the statistic is 0.39, meaning that the probability of observing rating changes 
in opposite directions is more than twice the one of observing rating changes in identical 
directions. This is the reflection of the rating bounce. If ratings are set to avoid this 
bounce, the statistics range from 0.98 to 4.01. For most of the parameter values chosen 
here, rating bounce avoidance thus leads to positive serial dependence in rating changes. 
The values are in line with the ones reported by Altman and Kao (1992) separately for 
issuer groups, and for up- and downgrades. The mean (median) of their statistics is 
1.752 (1.475), with a range of 0.2 to 3.83. 
The rating policy modeled here could thus account for the existing evidence. 
This is important as an another peculiarity of agency ratings, the through-the-cycle 
approach, cannot (see Löffler, 2001). Lando and Skødeberg (2001) document that the 
rating drift is especially pronounced for downgrades. This is sometimes explained by 
noting that agencies “dole out the bad news in small doses rather than savaging the bond 
issuer – who is, after all, their customer – all in one go” (Economist,1997, p. 71). But it 
could also be explained through avoidance of rating reversals. It seems likely that rating 
changes entail costs for the issuers, and that these costs are larger for downgrades. After 
a downgrade, investment restrictions may force investors to sell bonds, and covenants 
may restrict the flexibility of the borrower. If rating agencies act, at least partly, in the 
interest of their clients, they will try to avoid rating reversals particularly for  
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downgrades.
9 In the framework of this paper, such a policy is not the same as “doling 
out bad news in small doses” because rating changes are suppressed rather than handed 
out piecemeal. Rating drift arises because rating changes are only made when the credit 
quality is relatively close to the boundary triggering a further rating change. 
In a related experiment, I examine whether serial dependence could be due to 
infrequent rating reviews. Assume that agencies monitor ratings only in six month 
intervals. In the simulation, monitoring dates are thus t = 0, 6, 12 and so forth. At a 
monitoring date, the rating is set according to the credit quality, that is, there is no rating 
bounce avoidance. With such an infrequent monitoring, the simulated autocorrelation 
statistic is 0.80. If the frequency is further reduced to one rating review per year, the 
statistic increases to 0.89. It is thus difficult to explain the empirical evidence on serial 
correlation with infrequent monitoring  
3.3   Ratings lag changes in default probabilities  
Based on the option-theoretic models of Merton (1974) and Geske (1977), Delianedis 
and Geske (1999) use balance sheet data, equity values and equity volatilities to 
compute risk-neutral default probabilities for borrowers rated by Standard & Poor’s. 
They examine how these default probabilities evolve before a rating change, and find 
that they rise (fall) several months before a downgrade (upgrade). 
Within the simulated samples, I examine the default probabilities one month 
before the first downgrade, regardless of the magnitude of the downgrade. Recall from 
Table 1 that the initial default probability of grade 12 is 0.94%; the median default 
probability of the next lower rating class is 1.33%. If the rating agency does not aim at 
avoiding rating reversals, a downgrade occurs as soon as the default probability exceeds 
0.5 (0.94% + 1.33%) = 1.14%. Due to the discrete nature of the rating system, the 
default probability one month before a downgrade will not be equal to the initial one. 
Downgrades are more likely to be observed if the credit quality has declined within the 
range associated with the initial rating. This effect is documented in Table 4. Even if 
raters are not concerned about reversals (p*=0.5), the median default probability one 
                                                 
9 “Especially in the case of downgrades, the potentially self-fulfilling nature of ratings requires that 
Moody’s particularly endeavor to avoid ‘false’ negative predictions” (Moody’s Investors Service (2002, 
p. 4). 
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month before a downgrade has increased relative to the initial one, from 0.94% to 
1.04% The effect is relatively small, however, which is due to the rating system being 
relatively fine. With rating bounce avoidance (p*<0.5), rating changes lag much more 
behind changes in default probabilities. Depending on the parameters, the median 
default probability one month before a rating change can be up to 2.41%, more than 
twice the initial default probability of 0.94%. 
How do these figures compare to the results in Delianedis and Geske (1999)? 
For investment-grade bonds, the median risk-neutral default probability one month 
before any downgrade is 1.1%, while the median default probability of a benchmark 
sample which does not contain downgrades is 0.7%. These figures are very similar to 
the ones generated through intermediate assumptions on rating bounce avoidance. 
Setting p*=0.2 and m=0.5, for example, the comparable figures are 1.30% and 0.94%, 
respectively. 
Another piece of evidence against the informational efficiency of agency ratings 
is the study by Perraudin and Taylor (2001). They show that bond yields often lie above 
(below) the average yield of bonds with the next lower (higher) letter rating. In the 
examples presented here, tolerance regions do not spread across more than two ratings; 
an issuer with credit quality corresponding to AA- can have a rating of A+ or A, but not 
of A-. Together with pricing errors or uncontrolled factors, however, rating management 
can help to explain the empirical evidence.  
Some empirical studies (e.g. Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1992) suggest that 
bond price reactions to bond rating changes are relatively weak. It is therefore 
interesting to ask whether rating management could have such an effect.  As modeled in 
this paper, rating management does not lead to a situation in which rating changes are 
associated with smaller changes in credit quality. Managed or unmanaged, ratings 
change when credit quality crosses a threshold; the main difference is that, under rating 
management, thresholds are path-dependent. However, rating management makes it 
more difficult for outsiders to infer the underlying credit quality from ratings. In the 
information aggregation process leading to market prices, managed ratings will receive 
a weight that is smaller than the one investors would attach to unmanaged ones. As a 
consequence, price reactions to rating changes do not fully reflect the information 
produced by rating agencies. 
Finally,  I compare the effects of the rating policy to the ones that would arise 
from infrequent rating reviews. With semi-annual monitoring, the simulated median  
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default probability before a downgrade is 1.16%, which is lower than some of the values 
that obtain with rating bounce avoidance. With  p*=0.2 and m=0.5, for example, the 
median default probability is 1.30% (see Table 4). This shows that rating bounce 
avoidance can be more harmful to the timeliness of a rating system than restricting the 
number of rating reviews to only two per year. 
 
3.4     Sensitivity analyses 
To examine the robustness of the results, I re-run the analyses for the parameter 
combination p*=0.2 and m=0.5, making the following, non-accumulating variations:  
A  The initial credit quality conforms to rating 6 (~A) rather than 12 (~BB). 
B  Rating stability without rating management is set to 30% instead of 35%. 
C  Rating stability without rating management is set to 40% instead of 35%. 
D  Rating stability increases linearly from 30% (grade 17 ~ CCC) to 62% (grade 1 
~ AAA) instead of being constant at 35%. Stability for grade 12 (~BB) is 40%. 
E  Credit quality follows a mean-reverting process instead of a random walk: 
) 090 . 0 , 0 ( ~ , ) ( 015 . 0 1 0 1 N iid u u z z z z t t t t t + - = - - -             
The process has an annual variance of one. The annual speed of adjustment is 
(1-0.985
12)=0.166, which is at the upper end of the estimates that Fama and 
French (2002) obtain for the speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios. The 
tolerance regions account for the fact that the expected change in credit quality is 
non-zero whenever the credit quality differs from the initial one. 
Table 5 compares the simulation results with the previous ones. Differences are small, 
or as expected. Changing the initial credit quality from BB to A does not change rating 
stability or the autocorrelation statistic. The latter increases when rating stability without 
rating management is lowered to 30% because tolerance regions spread further into the 
next rating category; increasing stability to 40% leads to opposite effects. Making rating 
stability heterogeneous produces much the same results as a uniform stability of 40%; in 
both cases, the stability of the initial credit quality is 40%. With mean reversion the 
width of the rating categories remains the same but tolerance regions widen because 
mean reversion increases the probability of a rebound. In consequence, rating stability 
and the time-lag in rating actions increase. Since the credit quality is now negatively  
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autocorrelated, the autocorrelation statistic decreases. Nevertheless, previous 
conclusions can be upheld. 
Gordy and Heitfield (2001) use a structural model similar to the one presented in section 
2 to replicate empirical rating transition data. They find that choosing a fat-tailed 
distribution for credit quality provides a better fit than the normal. To check whether 
this finding can be the result of rating management,  I perform an analysis similar to 
Gordy and Heitfield (2001). From the data simulated in section 3, I obtain one-year 
transition frequencies of grade 12 issuers for the case that rating policy tolerates a 
reversal probability of 0.2 at a six-month horizon. I take the rating thresholds defined in 
section 2 as given, and calibrate the credit quality distribution that best replicates the 
simulated transition frequencies. Specifically, I assume that one-year changes in credit 
quality follow a scaled t distribution, and numerically search for the variance and the 
degrees of freedom that minimize the sum of squared differences between simulated 
transition frequencies and model transition probabilities of median issuers within grade 
12.
10 The best fit is obtained with 3 degrees of freedom;
 repeating the analysis for 
transition frequencies of grade 6 issuers produces the same result. Thus, empirical 
evidence of leptokurtosis is consistent with credit quality following a normal 
distribution, and agencies pursuing a policy of rating bounce avoidance. 
 
4   Concluding remarks 
The paper has shown that the wish to avoid frequent reversals of credit ratings could 
account for the stylized facts of agency ratings. Empirically, rating changes occur 
relatively seldom, they are serially dependent, and predictable using borrower 
fundamentals. Simulations reveal that rating bounce avoidance can explain these 
peculiarities very well. Moreover, predictability cannot be explained by another 
characteristic of the agencies’ rating system, the through-the-cycle approach (Löffler, 
2001). Rating bounce avoidance thus is an important candidate for explaining the 
stylized facts of agency ratings. Another candidate is informational inefficiency. If 
                                                 
10 The calibration does not include the transition to default because default is modeled as an exogenous 
event in this paper.  
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rating agencies are slow to react to new information, stability will increase, and rating 
changes will become predictable. Differentiating between these alternative explanations 
is difficult. The analysis has shown, however, that rating bounce avoidance can reduce 
the informational content of ratings by more than a rating system which reviews credit 
quality only twice per year. In addition, infrequent reviews cannot explain the observed 
serial dependence of rating changes. 
Moody’s claims that it manages ratings in order to “balance the market’s need 
for timely updates on issuer risk profiles, with its conflicting expectation for stable 
ratings” (Cantor, 2001, p.175). It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate what the 
market really wants, and whether rating agencies act in response to these preferences, or 
use this to cover any deficiencies of their ratings. It seems obvious, however, that the 
market’s preferences are not homogeneous. Rating management cannot serve all market 
participants alike. In addition, even if rating management meets an investor’s 
expectation for stability, there may be situations where this particular investor might 
want to know the precise credit quality, not the one obscured by rating management.  
There seem to be two ways of reducing informational losses due to rating 
bounce avoidance. One is to communicate the precise rating policy, the other is to 
change the rating system. A move towards greater transparency would be to state how 
wide the tolerance regions are in terms of rating grades. The analysis has shown that 
rating management can blur differences between adjacent rating categories. In effect, 
rating management can offset the increase in accuracy achieved through the rating 
modification (+ and  – in the case of Standard & Poor’s) introduced by the rating 
agencies in the early 1980s. Rating agencies could try to elicit market feedback on 
whether such an inaccuracy is indeed what the market wants. In the aftermath of the 
Enron default, Moody’s has initiated a dialogue on the quality and timeliness of ratings 
(cf. Moody’s Investors Service, 2002). The market response has confirmed Moody’s in 
its policy of avoiding rating reversals. Even though Moody’s aims at greater 
transparency, however, Moody’s has not specified its policy in more detail.  
The problem of rating bounces could be reduced by moving from a discrete 
rating system to a continuous one. This does not imply that the rating is equated with 
default probabilities; it could still reflect other dimensions of credit risk, e.g. recovery 
risk, or be based on a combination of default probabilities for various time horizons. 
There are various possible arguments against continuous ratings. For cognitive reasons, 
rating analysts might find it easier to aggregate their information into discrete  
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categories; rating agencies might be tempted to introduce random variation into ratings 
to pretend continuous monitoring activities; market participants might overestimate the 
accuracy of such a continuous rating. These arguments are appealing, but it has been 
shown in other contexts that continuously measured expectations can provide better 
results than qualitative ones. Batchelor (1986), for example, recommends to ask for 
continuous expectations of consumer price inflation rather than for qualitative 
responses.  
The upcoming reform of capital adequacy requirements (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2001) has spurred a discussion on the design of rating systems.
11 
Since rating bounce avoidance appears to be a driving factor behind rating dynamics, it 
should receive more attention in this discussion. The issue is not confined to external 
rating agencies. Banks might have incentives to manage internal ratings in a way similar 
to rating agencies. 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Krahnen and Weber (2001).  
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Table 1  
One-year default probabilities (%) within the model 
Historical default rates 
Rating 
Default probability at midpoint 
 of rating boundaries  S&P   Moody’s 
  1 ~ AAA  0.04  0  0 
  2 ~ AA+  0.05  0  0 
  3 ~ AA  0.06  0  0 
  4 ~ AA-  0.07  0.03  0.06 
  5 ~ A+  0.08  0.02  0 
  6 ~ A  0.09  0.05  0 
  7 ~ A-  0.10  0.05  0 
  8 ~ BBB+  0.12  0.12  0.07 
  9 ~ BBB  0.22  0.22  0.06 
10 ~ BBB-  0.35  0.35  0.39 
11 ~ BB+  0.44  0.44  0.64 
12 ~ BB  0.94  0.94  0.54 
13 ~ BB-  1.33  1.33  2.47 
14 ~ B+  2.91  2.91  3.48 
15 ~ B  8.38  8.38  6.23 
16 ~ B-  10.32  10.32  11.88 
17 ~ CCC  21.94  21.94  18.85 
Default rates are from Standard & Poor’s (2001) and Moody’s Investors Service (2001).   
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Table 2 
Simulated one-year stability of credit ratings for different rating policies  
m  (time horizon for reversal probability)  p* (tolerated reversal 
probability)  0.25  0.5  1 
0.1  0.58  0.73  0.87 
0.2  0.45  0.55  0.70 
0.3  0.38  0.43  0.51 
0.5  0.34  0.35  0.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Simulated serial dependence statistics for different rating policies 
m  (time horizon for reversal probability)  p* (tolerated reversal 
probability)  0.25  0.5  1 
0.1  1.86  2.45  4.01 
0.2  1.28  1.71  2.20 
0.3  0.98  1.15  1.50 
0.5  0.39  0.39  0.39 
The statistic is defined as the frequency of observing subsequent rating changes in the same direction divided by 
the frequency of observing subsequent rating changes in opposite directions. It is greater than one for positive 
serial dependence. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  
Simulated median default probabilities (%) in the month before a downgrade from 
grade 12 (default probability = 0.94%) for different rating policies 
m  (time horizon for reversal probability)  p* (tolerated reversal 
probability)  0.25  0.5  1 
0.1  1.32  1.76  2.41 
0.2  1.23  1.30  1.65 
0.3  1.16  1.21  1.27 
0.5  1.04  1.04  1.04 
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Table 5 
Sensitivity analyses (reversal probability  p*=0.2 and time horizon  m=0.5 for each 
experiment) 
    Variation 
  Base case  A  B  C  D  E 
One-year stability  0.55  0.55  0.50  0.60  0.61  0.67 
Autocorrelation statistic  1.71  1.67  1.98  1.46  1.47  1.20 
Default prob. before downgrade (%)  1.30  0.10  1.33  1.28  1.29  1.60 
A: Initial credit quality ~ A; B: rating stability = 30%; C: rating stability = 40%; D: rating stability decreasing 
from 62% to 30%; E: mean-reverting credit quality. 
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Figure 1 
Schematic representation of the rating policy for a one-period change in credit quality of 
a borrower rated i in t = 0 
 
 
  
 
   Density 
of z1 
Boundaries for 
rating i 
zo 
 
Credit quality z1
Rating in t=1         i + 2              i + 1                          i                           i  – 1         i  – 2 
Tolerance 
regions  
 
 
 
Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting 
No.96:  Andreas A. Jobst, Collateralized Loans Obligations (CLOs)  – A Primer, 
December 2002 
No.95:  Günther Gebhardt/Rolf Reichardt/Carsten Wittenbrink, Accounting for 
Financial Instruments in the Banking Industry, November 2002 
No.94:  Ulf Herold/Raimond Maurer, Portfolio choice and estimation risk  – A 
comparison of Bayesian approaches to resampled efficiency, June 2002 
No.93:  Olivia S. Mitchell/David McCarthy, Annuities for an Ageing World, June 2002 
No.92:  Ulf Herold/Raimond Maurer, How much foreign stocks? Classical versus 
Bayesian approaches to asset allocation, June 2002 
No.91:  Gunter Löffler/Patrick F. Panther/Erik Theissen, Who Knows What When? – 
The Information Content of Pre-IPO Market Prices, June 2002 
No.90:  Reinhard Hujer/Sandra Vuletic/Stefan Kokot, The Markov switching ACD 
model, April 2002 
No.89:  Markus C. Arnold/Robert M. Gillenkirch, Stock Options as Incentive Contracts 
and Dividend Policy, April 2002 
No.88:  Anne d'Arcy /Sonja Grabensberger, The Quality of Neuer Markt Quarterly 
Reports - an Empirical Investigation, January 2002 
No.87:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/Ingo Tschach, Microfinance als ein Geflecht von 
Anreizproblemen, Dezember 2001 (erscheint in den Schriften des Vereins für 
Socialpolitik, 2002) 
No.86:  Ralf Elsas/Yvonne Löffler, Equity Carve-Outs and Corporate Control in Germany, 
December 2001 
No.85:  Günther Gebhardt/Stefan Heiden/Holger Daske, Determinants of Capital 
Market Reactions to Seasoned Equity Offers by German Corporations, December 
2001 
No.84:  Hergen Frerichs/Gunter Löffler, Evaluating credit risk models: A critique and a 
proposal, October, 2001 
No. 83:  Ivica Dus/Raimond  Maurer, Integrated Asset Liability Modelling for Property 
Casuality Insurance: A Portfolio Theoretical Approach, October 2001 (erscheint in 
Handbuch Asset-Liability Management, hrsg. von M. Rudolph u.a.)  
 
  
 
No.82:  Raimond Maurer/Frank Reiner, International Asset Allocation with Real Estate 
Securities in a Shortfall-Risk Framework: The Viewpoint of German and US 
Investors, September 2001 
No.81:  Helmut Laux, Das Unterinvestitionsproblem beim EVA-Bonussystem, August 
2001  
No.80:  Helmut Laux, Bedingungen der Anreizkompatibilität, Fundierung von 
Unternehmenszielen und Anreize für deren Umsetzung, July 2001 
No. 79:  Franklin Allen/Douglas Gale, Banking and Markets, July 2001 
No.78:  Joachim Grammig/Michael Melvin/Christian Schlag, Price Discovery in 
International Equity Trading, July 2001 
No.77:  Joachim Grammig/Reinhard Hujer/Stefan Kokot, Tackling Boundary Effects in 
Nonparametric Estimation of Intra-Day Liquidity Measures, July 2001 
No.76:     Angelika Esser / Christian Schlag , A Note on Forward and Backward Partial 
Differential Equations for Derivative Contracts with Forwards as Underlyings, June 
2001 
No.75:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/Marcel Tyrell/Andreas Hackethal, The Convergence of 
Financial Systems in Europe, May 2001 (erscheint in: Schmalenbach Business 
Review, 2002) 
No.74:  Ulf Herold, Structural positions and risk budgeting  - Quantifying the impact of 
structural postions and deriving implications for active portfolio management, May 
2001 
No.73:  Jens Wüstemann, Mängel bei der Abschlußprüfung: Tatsachenberichte und 
Analyse aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht, April 2001 (erschienen in: „Der 
Wirtschaftsprüfer als Element der Corporate Governance“, Zentrum für 
Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, Bonn 2001, S. 25-60) 
No.72:  Reinhard H. Schmidt, The Future of Banking in Europe, March 2001(erscheint in 
Kapitalmarkt und Portfolio Management, 2002) 
No.71:  Michael H. Grote/Britta K lagge, Wie global sind Japans Banken? Die 
Veränderung institutioneller Bedingungen und ihre Auswirkungen auf die 
internationale Präsenz japanischer Kreditinstitute, April 2001 
No.70:  Stefan Feinendegen/Eric Nowak, Publizitätspflichten börsennotierter 
Aktiengesellschaften im Spannungsfeld zwischen Regelberichterstattung und Ad-
hoc-Publizität  - Überlegungen zu einer gesetzeskonformen und 
kapitalmarktorientierten Umsetzung, März 2001 (erscheint in: Die 
Betriebswirtschaft) 
No.69:  Martin F. Grace/Robert W. Klein/Paul R. Kleindorfer, The Demand for 
Homeowners Insurance with Bundled Catastrophe Coverages, March 2001 
  
 
No.68:  Raimond Maurer/Martin Pitzer/Steffen Sebastian, Konstruktion transaktions-
basierter Immobilienindizes: Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Umsetzung 
für den Wohnungsmarkt in Paris, Februar 2001  
No.67:  Gyöngyi Bugár/Raimond Maurer, International Equity Portfolios and Currency 
Hedging: The Viewpoint of German and Hungarian Investors, February 2001 
(erscheint in. ASTIN-Bulletin) 
No.66:  Rainer Brosch, Portfolio-aspects in real options management, February 2001 
No.65a:  Marcel Tyrell/Reinhard H. Schmidt, Pension Systems and Financial Systems in 
Europe:A Comparison from the Point of View of Complementarity, July 2001 
No.65:  Marcel Tyrell/Reinhard H. Schmidt, Pensions- und Finanzsysteme in Europa: 
Ein Vergleich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Komplementarität, Februar 2001 
(erschienen in gekürzter Fassung in: „Private Versicherung und Soziale Sicherung“, 
Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Roland Eisen, hrsg. von H.-C. 
Mager, H. Schäfer, K. Schrüfer, Metropolis: Marburg),  
No.64:  Jutta Dönges/Frank Heinemann, Competition for Order Flow as a Coordination 
Game, January 2001 
No.63:  Eric Nowak/Alexandra Gropp, Ist der Ablauf der Lock-up-Frist  bei 
Neuemissionen ein kursrelevantes Ereignis, Dezember 2000 (erschienen in 
Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, Februar 2002) 
No.62:  Ulrich Kaiser/Andrea Szczesny, Einfache ökonometrische Verfahren für die 
Kreditrisikomessung: Verweildauermodelle, Dezember 2000 
No.61:  Ulrich Kaiser/Andrea Szczesny, Einfache ökonometrische Verfahren für die 
Kreditrisikomessung: Logit- und Probit-Modelle, Dezember 2000 
No.60:  Andreas Hackethal, How Unique Are US Banks? - The Role of Banks in Five 
Major Financial Systems, , December 2000 (erschienen  in: Zeitschrift für 
Nationalökonomie und Statistik, Vol. 221, S. 592-619) 
No.59:  Rolf Elgeti/Raimond Maurer, Zur Quantifizierung der Risikoprämien deutscher 
Versicherungsaktien im Kontext eines Multifaktorenmodells,  Oktober 2000 
(erschienen in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 4/2000, S. 
577- 603.) 
No.58:  Harald A. Benink/Reinhard H. Schmidt, Towards a Regulatory Agenda for 
Banking in Europe, September 2000 (erschienen in: Research in Financial Services-
Bank Crises: Causes, Analysis and Prevention, Vol.12, JAI Press-Elsevier Science, 
hrsg. von George G. Kaufman, 2000) 
No.57:  Thomas G. Stephan/Raimond Maurer/Martin Dürr, A Multiple Factor Model 
for European Stocks, September 2000 
No.56:  Martin Nell/Andreas Richter, Catastrophe Index-Linked Securities and 
Reinsurance as Substituties, August 2000  
 
No.55:  Four short papers on Development Finance, August 2000 
  Reinhard H. Schmidt, Entwicklungsfinanzierung; (erschienen in: Handwörterbuch 
des Bank- und Finanzwesens, 3. Aufl., hrsg. von Wolfgang Gerke und Manfred 
Steiner, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel, 2001) 
  Reinhard H. Schmidt, Banking Regulation contra Microfinance; (erschienen in: 
Savings and Development, Vol. 24 (2000) , S.111-121.) 
  Ingo Tschach, The Impact of Inflation on Long-Term Housing Loans; 
  Eva Terberger-Stoy/Marcel Tyrell, Joseph E. Stiglitz (erschienen in: 
Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit, 41. Jahrgang (2000), S. 46-49) 
No.54:  Raimond Maurer/Thomas G. Stephan, Vermögensanlagevorschriften für 
deutsche Versicherungsunternehmen: Status Quo und finanzwirtschaftliche 
Bewertungen, Juli 2000 (erschienen in: Handbuch Spezialfonds (hrsg. von J.M. 
Kleeberg und C. Schlenger), Bad Soden 2000, S. 143-176.),  
No.53:  Joachim Grammig/Reinhard Hujer/Stefan Kokot, B ias-free Nonparametric 
Estimation of Intra-Day Trade Activity Measures, June 2000 
No.52:  Raimond Maurer / Steffen Sebastian / Thomas G. Stephan, Immobilienindizes 
im Portfolio-Management, Mai 2000 (erscheint in Deutscher Aktuarverein (Hrsg.): 
Investmentmodelle für das Asset-Liability-Modelling von 
Versicherungsunternehmen, 2002) 
No.51:  Raimond Maurer / Steffen Sebastian, Inflation Risk Analysis of European Real 
Estate Securities, Mai 2000 (erscheint in: Journal of Real Estate Research, 2002) 
No.50:  Andreas  Hackethal / Reinhard H. Schmidt, Finanzsysteme und 
Komplementarität, April 2000 ( erschienen in: Kredit und Kapital, Beiheft 15 
"Neue finanzielle Arrangements: Märkte im Umbruch", 2000, S. 53-102) 
No.49:  Mark Wahrenburg/ Susanne Niethen, Vergleichende Analyse alternativer 
Kreditrisikomodelle, April 2000 (erschienen in: Kredit und Kapital, Heft 2, 2000) 
No.48:  Christian Leuz, IAS versus US GAAP: A "New Market" Based Comparsion, 
January 2000 
No.47:  Ralf Elsas/ Mahmoud El-Shaer/ Erik Theissen, Beta and Returns Revisited – 
Evidence from the German Stock Market, December 1999 
No.46:  Michael H. Grote/Sofia Harrschar-Ehrnborg/Vivien Lo, Technologies and 
Proximities: Frankfurt´s New Role in the European Financial Centre System, 
December 1999 
No.45:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/Adalbert Winkler, Building Financial Institutions 
Developing Countries, November 1999 ( erschienen in: "Journal für 
Entwicklungspolitik", XVI/3, 2000, S. 329-346) 
  
 
No.44:  Konstantin Korolev/Kai D. Leifert/ Heinrich Rommelfanger, Arbitragetheorie 
bei vagen Erwartungen der Marktteilnehmer, November 1999  
No.43:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/Stefanie Grohs, Angleichung der Unternehmensverfassung 
in Europa  –Ein Forschungsprogramm, November 1999 (erschienen in: 
Systembildung und Systemlücken in Kerngebieten des Europäischen Privatrechts, 
hrsg. von Stefan Grundmann, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000, S. 146-188) 
No.42:  Konstantin Kovolev/Kai D. Leifert/ Heinrich Rommelfanger, 
Optionspreistheorie bei vagen Daten, Oktober 1999  
No.41:  Christian Leuz/Robert E. Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased 
Disclosure (erscheint in: Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement 2000), June 
2000 
No.40:  Christian Leuz, The Development of Voluntary Cash Flow Statements in 
Germany and the Influence of International Reporting Standards, July 1999 
(erschienen in: Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 52 (2), April, 2000, S. 182-
207.)  
No.39:  Ulrike Stefani, Quasirenten, Prüferwechsel und rationale Adressaten, Juni 1999  
No.38:  Michael Belledin/Christian Schlag, An Empirical Comparison of A lternative 
Stochastic Volatility Models, June 1999  
No.37:  Jens Wüstemann, Internationale Rechnungslegungsnormen und neue 
Institutionenökonomik, Mai 1999  
No.36:  Robert Gillenkirch/Matthias M. Schabel, Die Bedeutung der 
Periodenerfolgsrechnung für die Investitionssteuerung  – Der Fall ungleicher 
Zeitpräferenzen, April 1999 (die überarbeitete Fassung "Investitionssteuerung, 
Motivation und Periodenerfolgsrechnung bei ungleichen Zeitpräferenzen" erscheint 
voraussichtlich 2001 in der ZfbF) 
No.35:  Reinhard H. Schmidt, Differences between Financial Systems in Europe: 
Consequences for EMU, April 1999 (erschienen  in "The Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism: Recent Developments and Lessous for Europe", hrsg. v. Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Houndsmill (UK),  2001, S. 208-240) 
No.34:  Theodor Baums/Erik Theissen, Banken, bankeigene Kapitalanlagegesellschaften 
und Aktienemissionen, März 1999 (erschienen in: Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und 
Bankwirtschaft, 11 (1999), Heft 3, S. 125-134) 
No.33:  Andreas Hackethal/Reinhard H. Schmidt, Financing Patterns: Measurement 
Concepts and Empirical Results, May 2000 
No.32:  Michael H. Haid/Eric Nowak, Executive compensation and the susceptibility of 
firms to hostile takeovers – An empirical investigation of the U.S. oil  industry, 
March 1999 
  
 
No.31:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/Jens Maßmann, Drei Mißverständnisse zum Thema 
"Shareholder Value", Februar 1999 (erschienen in Kumar/ Osterloh/ Schreyögg 
(Hrsg.):Unternehmensethik und die Transformation des Wettbewerbs, Festschrift 
für Professor Dr. Dr. h. c. Horst Steinmann zum 65. Geburtstag,1999, Schäffer-
Poeschel Verlag Stuttgart, S.125-157 ) 
No.30:  Eberhard Feess/Michael Schieble, Credit Scoring and Incentives for Loan 
Officers in a Principal Agent Model, January 1999 
No.29:  Joachim Grammig/Dirk Schiereck/Erik Theissen, Informationsbasierter 
Aktienhandel über IBIS, Januar 1999 (erscheint in überarbeiteter Fassung in: 
Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftlicher Forschung) 
No.28:  Ralf Ewert/Eberhard Feess/Martin Nell, Auditor Liability Rules under Imperfect 
Information and Costly Litigation  – The Welfare Increasing Effect of Liability 
Insurance, January 1999 (erschienen in European Accounting Review – genauer!)) 
No.27:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence, Corporate Governance 
and Complementarity, March 2000 (erscheint in: Jeffrey Gordon & Mark Roe, eds.: 
Convergence and Rersistence of Corporate Governance Systems, University of 
Chicago Press, 2001) 
No.26:  Thorsten Freihube/Carl-Heinrich Kehr/Jan P. Krahnen/Erik Theissen, Was 
leisten Kursmakler? Eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel der Frankfurter 
Wertpapierbörse, Dezember 1998 (erschienen in: Kredit und Kapital, 32(1999), 
Heft3, S. 426-460. 
No. 25:  Jens Maßmann/Reinhard H. Schmidt, Recht, internationale Unternehmens- 
strategien und Standortwettbewerb, D ecember 1998 (erschienen in: Jahrbuch für 
Neue Politische Ökonomie, Band 18, hrsg. von K.-E. Schenk u.a., Tübingen 2000, 
S. 169-204) 
No. 24:  Eberhard Feess/Martin Nell, The Manager and the Auditor in a Double Moral 
Hazard Setting: Efficiency through Contingent Fees and Insurance Contracts, 
December 1998 
No. 23:  Carl-Heinrich Kehr/Jan P. Krahnen/Erik Theissen, The Anatomy of a Call 
Market: Evidence from Germany, December 1998 
No. 22:  Christian K. Muus, Non-voting shares in France: An empirical analysis of the 
voting premium, December 1998 
No. 21:  Christian Leuz, Voluntary Disclosure of Cash Flow Statements and Segment Data 
in Germany, September 1998 
No. 20:  Anne D`Arcy, The Degree of Determination of National Accounting Systems – An 
Empirical Investigation, September 1998 
No. 19:  Helmut Laux, Marktwertmaximierung und CAPM im Ein- und Mehrperioden-Fall, 
September 1998 (erschienen in Unternehmensführung, Ethik und Umwelt, 
Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Hartmut Kreikebaum, hrsg. von Gerd-Rainer 
Wagner, Wiesbaden 1999, S. 226-251)  
 
No. 18:  Joachim Grammig/Reinhard Hujer/Stefan Kokot/Kai-Oliver Maurer, 
Ökonometrische Modellierung von Transaktionsintensitäten auf Finanzmärkten; 
Eine Anwendung von Autoregressive Conditional Duration Modellen auf die IPO 
der Deutschen Telekom, August 1998 
No. 17:  Hanne Böckem, An Investigation into the Capital Market Reaction on Accounting 
Standards Enforcement, July 1998 
No. 16:  Erik Theissen, Der Neue Markt: Eine Bestandsaufnahme, April 1998 (erschienen 
in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Heft 4/98, S. 623-652) 
No. 15:  Jan Pieter Krahnen, Finanzierungstheorie: Ein selektiver Überblick, April 1998 
(englische Fassung erschienen in "Gutenberg Centennial", hrsg. von Horst Albach, 
Berlin, 2000) 
No. 14:  Erik Theissen, Liquiditätsmessung auf experimentellen Aktienmärkten, April 1998 
(erschienen in: Kredit und Kapital, 32(1999), Heft 2, S. 225-264) 
No. 13:  Reinhard H. Schmidt, Erich Gutenberg und die Theorie der Unternehmung, 
February 1998 (englische Fassung erschienen in "Theory of the Firm", hrsg. von 
Horst Albach u.a., Berlin 2000, S. 3-39) 
No. 12:  Adalbert Winkler, Financial Development, Economic Growth and Corporate 
Governance, February 1998 (erschienen in: Asian Financial Markets, hrsg. von 
Lukas Menkhoff/Beate Reszat, Baden-Baden 1998, S. 15-44) 
No. 11:  Andreas R. Hackethal/Marcel Tyrell, Complementarity and Financial Systems – 
A Theoretical Approach, December 1998 
No. 10:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/Andreas Hackethal/Marcel Tyrell, Disintermediation 
and the Role of Banks in Europe: An International Comparison, January 1998 
(erschienen in: Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 8, 1999, S.37-67) 
No. 9:  Stefan Heiden/Günther Gebhardt/Irmelin Burkhardt, Einflußfaktoren für 
Kursreaktionen auf die Ankündigung von Kapitalerhöhungen deutscher 
Aktiengesellschaften, December 1997 
No. 8:   Martin Nell, Garantien als Signale für die Produktqualität?, November 1997 
(erscheint in: Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung) 
No. 7:   Robert M. Gillenkirch, Anreizwirkungen und  Bewertung von 
Erfolgsbeteiligungen im Portefeuillemanagement, November 1997 (erschienen in: 
ZfB, Sonderheft Finanzmanagement 1999) 
No. 6:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/C.-P. Zeitinger, Critical Issues in Microbusiness Finance 
and the Role of Donors, October 1997 (erschienen in: Strategic Issues in 
Microfinance, ed. by Kimenyi/Wieland/Von Pischke, Averbury, UK, 1998, S. 27-
51) 
No. 5:  Erik Theissen/Mario Greifzu, Performance deutscher Rentenfonds, September 
1997 (erschienen in: Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche F orschung, 50.  Jg., 
1998, S. 436-461)  
 
No. 4:  Jan Pieter Krahnen/Martin Weber, Marketmaking in the Laboratory: Does 
Competition Matter?, September 1997 
No. 3:  Reinhard H. Schmidt, Corporate Governance: The Role of Other Constituen-cies, 
July 1997 (erschienen in: Pezard, Alice;Thiveaud, Jean-Marie (Hrsg.): Corporate  
Governance: Cross Border Experience, Paris, 1997, S. 61-74) 
No. 2:  Ralf Ewert/Christian Ernst, Strategic Management Accounting, Coordination and 
Long-term Cost Structure, July 1997 (erschienen unter dem Titel "Target Costing, 
Coordination and Strategic Cost Management" in Euopean Accounting Review, 
Vol.8, No.1 (1999), S. 23-49) 
No. 1:   Jan P. Krahnen/Christian Rieck/Erik Theissen, Insider Trading and Portfolio 
Structure in Experimental Asset Markets with a Long Lived Asset, July 1997 
(erschienen in European Journal of Finance, Vol. 5, Nr. 1, March 1999, S. 29-50) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
  
  
Kontaktadresse für Bestellungen: 
 
Professor Dr. Reinhard H. Schmidt 
Wilhelm Merton Professur für  
Internationales Bank- und Finanzwesen 
Mertonstr. 17 
Postfach 11 19 32 / HPF66 
D-60054 Frankfurt/Main 
 
Tel.: +49-69-798-28269 
Fax: +49-69-798-28272 
e-mail: rschmidt@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de 
http://www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de/schmidt/WPs/wp/wpliste.html 
Mit freundlicher Unterstützung der  
Unternehmen der Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe Hessen-Thüringen. 